Find sigma rule 
Attack: Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs
An adversary may disable or modify cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable or modify logging to avoid detection of their activities.
For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) They may alternatively tamper with logging functionality – for example, by removing any associated SNS topics, disabling multi-region logging, or disabling settings that validate and/or encrypt log files.(Citation: AWS Update Trail)(Citation: Pacu Detection Disruption Module) In Office 365, an adversary may disable logging on mail collection activities for specific users by using the Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation cmdlet, by disabling M365 Advanced Auditing for the user, or by downgrading the user’s license from an Enterprise E5 to an Enterprise E3 license.(Citation: Dark Reading Microsoft 365 Attacks 2021)
MITRE
Tactic
- defense-evasion
technique
- T1562.008
Test : GCP - Delete Activity Event Log
OS
- iaas:gcp
Description:
GCP provides 4 types of Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity, Data Access, System Events, and Policy Denied. An adversary may attempt to delete logs in order to hide their activity. However, Admin Activity, System Events, and Policy Deny events logs cannot be deleted.
This Atomic attempts to delete the Activity Event log. An event is generated under the method name of google.logging.v2.LoggingServiceV2.DeleteLog with a Serverity of ERROR.
Executor
sh